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Abstract:  
Informational economies of scope between lending and underwriting are a mixed blessing for 
universal banks. While they can reduce the cost of raising capital for a firm, they also reduce 
incentives in the underwriting business. We show that tying lending and underwriting helps to 
overcome this dilemma. First, risky debt in tied deals works as a bond to increase 
underwriting incentives. Second, with limitations on contracting, tying reduces the 
underwriting rents as the additional incentives from debt can substitute for monetary 
incentives. In addition, reducing the yield on the tied debt is a means to pay for the rent in the 
underwriting business and to transfer informational benefits to the client. Thus, tying is a 
double edged sword for universal banks. It helps to compete against specialized investment 
banks, but it can reduce the rent to be earned in investment banking when universal banks 
compete against each other. We derive several empirical predictions regarding the 
characteristics of tied deals. 
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Keywords: Tying, Investment Banking, Universal Banking P e r h a p si tw a sn o ts u c hab r i g h ti d e at oo ﬀer credit to investment-banking clients
at less-than-market rates–even though this has been a chief calling card over the
past few years for those commercial banks that wanted to get into the juicy business
of investment banking. After all, it is precisely the riskiest borrowers, those who have
trouble borrowing elsewhere, that are most likely to take up aspiring investment banks
on their oﬀers of credit. (Economist, “Thanks a bundle,” August 24, 2002)
1 Introduction
For many years, the Glass-Steagall Act prevented commercial banks from doing investment-
banking business. But in the late 1980s the strict separation of the ﬁnancial services industry in
the United States was relaxed, and in 1999 it was ﬁnally repealed by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act. This development was much anticipated by those commercial
banks that were eager to enter the investment banking business. At the same time, the regula-
tory change also raised the concerns of critics who feared potential conﬂicts of interest associated
with universal banking, which was the primary justiﬁcation for the Glass-Steagall Act.
Academic research has kept abreast of this discussion and analyzed the potential costs and
beneﬁts of universal banks versus functionally separated investment and commercial banks.1
However, the role of a universal bank’s ability to tie lending and underwriting, i.e., to provide
credit to its investment-banking clients, has largely been ignored in the theoretical literature
even though it is a widespread practice. For example, Drucker and Puri (2005) ﬁnd that 20%
of seasoned equity oﬀerings in the ﬁrst half of 2001 involved a loan from the underwriter to
the issuer. Moreover, reports in the popular press, such as the Economist, suggest that tying
is a main competitive weapon for universal banks and plays an important role in winning
investment-banking clients. The exact source and mechanism of the competitive advantage is,
however, less clear.
The aim of this paper is to partially close this gap by providing a detailed theoretical analysis
1See, e.g., Benston (1990), Kroszner and Rajan (1994), Puri (1994, 1999), Boot and Thakor (1997), Gande
et al. (1997), Gande et al. (1999), Kanatas and Qi (1998, 2003), Ber et al. (2001) and, for a survey of the
theoretical and empirical literature, Rajan (1996).
2of diﬀerent aspects of tying. We thereby address two main questions. First, why and when
does tying occur? Second, what are the implications of tying for the choice of underwriters and
for competition in the underwriting business?
The literature has focused on informational economies of scope in lending and underwriting
as a main advantage of universal banking. Informational economies of scope can directly lead
to a potential tying beneﬁti faﬁrm needs debt and equity and the cost of monitoring or
building a relation is lower when lending and underwriting are provided by the same ﬁnancial
institution (Drucker and Puri, 2005).2 Informational economies of scope are also important if a
ﬁrm needs bank debt after a failed attempt to issue securities and the universal bank employs
its information advantage to allow lending at a lower cost. Kanatas and Qi (2003) show that
this cost savings results in a rent for the universal bank after a failed underwriting and therefore
reduces incentives to exert underwriting eﬀorts. However, a universal bank may provide debt
not only after a failure of underwriting, but also prior to underwriting in a tied deal. We show
that risky debt in tied deals increases eﬀort incentives in underwriting and thus provide a novel
role for tying above and beyond informational economies of scale.
Consider a ﬁrm that needs to raise equity in an initial public oﬀering or seasoned equity
issue. If the equity issue fails, the ﬁrm can alternatively approach a bank to lend funds, but
in this case it will engage in risk shifting and pursue an operating strategy that has a lower
value. The ﬁrm already has some risky debt outstanding, the value of which is also negatively
aﬀected by risk shifting. To exert eﬀort in underwriting, the investment bank has to be provided
with incentives, which the ﬁrm may oﬀer in the form of a bonus for successful underwriting.
Underwriting services can be obtained from a specialized investment bank or a universal bank.
The main diﬀerence is that a universal bank can also lend funds to ﬁrms. This diﬀerence is
important for two reasons. First, the universal bank can lend after failure of the equity issue, as
in Kanatas and Qi (2003). Second, the universal bank can take on the outstanding debt in a tied
2Gande et al. (1997), Yasuda (2005), and Bharath et al. (forthcoming) ﬁnd that previous lending generally
is associated with lower yields for the bond and lower underwriting fees. Bond underwriting is the area where
commercial banks are likely to have the greatest information advantage from their lending relationship. As
Drucker and Puri (2005) and Bharath et al. (forthcoming) suggest, this beneﬁt also seems to be present in
equity underwriting.
3deal. The contribution of our paper concerns this second eﬀect. We show that tying has several
beneﬁts for the ﬁrm and aﬀects the competition for underwriting that exists between investment
banks and universal banks. First, risky debt in a tied deal provides additional incentives in the
underwriting business. Debt works as a bond to increase incentives in underwriting as the value
of the debt is negatively aﬀected if the underwriting fails. This beneﬁti sp r e s e n te v e ni nt h e
absence of limitations on the possible contracts for underwriting services. Second, limitations of
contracting may result in a rent to be earned in the underwriting business. Tying reduces this
rent. One reason is, again, the additional incentives from debt, which substitutes for monetary
incentives. In addition, a below-market rate of return on the tied debt is a means to pay for
the rent in the underwriting business. Because of competition between commercial banks, the
beneﬁts of tying accrue to the commercial banks’ clients. Thus, tying is a double-edged sword
for universal banks. On the one hand, it helps to compete against specialized investment banks
and may be a prerequisite for entering the market. On the other hand, it may reduce the rent
to be earned in investment banking.
Our model helps to explain two phenomena of tied deals, which are addressed in the Econo-
mist quote above and conﬁrmed by the empirical ﬁndings of Drucker and Puri (2005): debt
in tied deals often exhibits high risk and less-than-market rates. The rationale for high risk is
that the incentive eﬀect increases in the risk of the debt, while adjusting the terms of the credit
is a means to pay for rents in the underwriting business. If incentives stem from reputation, an
alternative to reducing the rate is reducing the underwriter fee. In addition to that, we derive
several further, empirically testable hypotheses. With respect to the choice of underwriter, our
model predicts that universal banks providing tied deals are most likely to be chosen i) by ﬁrms
with quite transparent business plans, ii) by ﬁrms which are little focused, e.g., conglomerates,
(iii) by less innovative ﬁrms, and (iv) if hot issue markets prevail.
Our model is related to that of Kanatas and Qi (2003). However, the focus diﬀers in that
our objective is to analyze the role of tying. We also contribute to the analysis of Kanatas
and Qi more directly by carving out the implications of contracting problems and the role of
incentives from reputation rents in investment banking. When rents from future business are an
important incentive, the incentive eﬀect of a universal bank’s ability to earn a rent from lending
4after failed underwriting may be reversed.3 A universal bank may have greater incentives to
exert eﬀort in underwriting than a specialized investment bank, even in the absence of tying.
We focus on equity underwriting, but the beneﬁt of tying is also present for other investment-
banking services whenever the quality of the investment-baking service aﬀects the value of
the client’s outstanding debt. Examples include corporate restructurings and mergers and
acquisitions where the quality of advice aﬀects not only a ﬁrm’s outstanding equity, but also
its risky debt positions.
Hakenes (2004) also raised the notion that a loan can serve as a mechanism to harmonize
the interests of a ﬁrm and a bank, thereby alleviating problems that arise from asymmetric
information. In his model, the loan makes it credible for a bank (the risk manager) to obtain
the information required for the risk management process.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we outline the model and explore the
diﬀerences between specialized investment banks and universal banks in a model with double-
sided moral hazard and potential limitations on contracting. We introduce tying in Section 3
and analyze its role in overcoming the incentive problems of universal banks. In Section 4 we
extend the analysis by considering the role of reputation. In Section 5 we discuss our ﬁndings by
carving out the main empirical hypotheses emerging from our theoretical analysis. In Section
6 we summarize our results.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
We consider a ﬁrm in a risk-neutral economy with an investment opportunity to expand an ex-
isting business ﬁeld. For example, the ﬁrm needs to make a further investment in one particular
area to bring its existing products or ideas to the market.
The investment decision is intertwined with a choice of strategy, A, B or C.S t r a t e g yA is
the ﬁrst-best strategy. However, it is not contractible and provides the ﬁrm with the ﬂexibility
to switch to strategy C.S t r a t e g yB is the second-best strategy; it is less ﬂexible than strategy
A and contractible.
3The role of reputation in investment banking is analyzed by, e.g., Booth and Smith (1986) and Chemmanur
and Fulghieri (1994). We extend this literature by introducing tying in a model with reputation.
5Given strategy A, the project’s payoﬀsa r eπA with probability qA ∈ (0,1) and π with
probability (1 − qA), where πA >π . The expected payoﬀ is VA ≡ π + qA(πA − π). The risk-
free rate is normalized to zero, and we assume that the expected payoﬀ exceeds the required
investment I, i.e., VA >I.Without investment, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is normalized to zero.
The ﬁrm has no funds to ﬁnance the expansion. It can either take on a bank loan or issue
equity, using the underwriting service of a specialized investment bank or a universal bank.
The ﬁrm already has some risky debt outstanding with a repayment obligation D0 >πfrom
previous rounds of investment.4 This captures the observation that ﬁrms generally have some
debt outstanding prior to issuing equity through a seasoned equity oﬀering or initial public
oﬀering in a “second” round of ﬁnancing.5
Debt ﬁnancing If the ﬁrm uses debt to ﬁnance its expansion, the debt level may aﬀect the
choice of strategy. In particular, the ﬁrm may engage in risk shifting and pursue the riskier
strategy C. In this case the project’s payoﬀsa r eπC with probability qC ∈ (0,1) and π with
probability (1 − qC), where πC > πA, qC <q A, and VA >V C ≡ π + qC(πC − π). Thus, strategy
C realizes a higher payoﬀ than strategy C if it is a success, but the expected payoﬀ is lower. As
the choice of strategy A is not contractible, for a given total debt repayment obligation D>π ,
the ﬁrm will choose strategy C if qA(πA − D) <q C(πC − D). The maximum total D for which
the ﬁrm still chooses strategy A is given by
ˆ D =( qAπA − qCπC)/(qA − qC). (1)
The model introduces a potential risk-shifting problem in the simplest possible manner,
which provides the rationale for equity ﬁnancing in our model. For D0 > ˆ D, incentives to shift
to strategy C already stem from the initial debt. We assume D0 ≤ ˆ D.T h u s ,ˆ D1 = ˆ D−D0 puts
an upper bound on the amount of credit that can be raised to ﬁnance the project expansion
while retaining incentives to choose strategy A.
4It is not necessary that the ﬁrm has been entirely debt-ﬁnanced. It suﬃces that the ﬁrm’s balance sheet
contains some (risky) debt.
5See, for example, Berger and Udell (1998), Table 1C, who ﬁnd that young ﬁrms are ﬁnanced with a very
high level of debt.
6Raising credit costs c (monitoring cost, due diligence, etc.). We denote the present value of
debt given the credit repayment obligation D and strategy s as Ps(D). To ﬁnance strategy A
completely with debt, the ﬁrm has to raise PA(D)=I + c.
Lemma 1 The ﬁrm can ﬁnance the project entirely with debt and still chooses strategy A if
PA( ˆ D1) ≥ I + c. The ﬁrm will not choose strategy A if the project is entirely debt ﬁnanced and
PA( ˆ D1) <I+ c. Instead, it has to use (some) equity.
In the following we assume that PA( ˆ D1) <I+c.T h u s ,t h eﬁrm has to use equity to pursue
strategy A. However, for our analysis it is important to also deﬁne the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ if
it has to use debt after a failed equity issue. If the ﬁrm receives debt instead of equity to pursue
strategy A, it will instead choose strategy C, resulting in an expected payoﬀ VC.( R e c a l lt h a t
it is not possible to commit to strategy A.) Debt holders anticipate the ﬁrm’s incentives and
the ﬁrm has to bear the adverse consequences of its risk shifting incentives. Thus, when the
ﬁrm has to use debt after a failed equity issue, it may be ex ante optimal to choose a strategy
that allows for more commitment than strategy A so as to reduce the risk shifting problem.
For example, the ﬁrm can start at a smaller scale or choose to invest in an already existing,
diﬀerent business ﬁeld that involves less ﬂexibility and where more collateralizable tangible
assets are available compared to the business ﬁeld to which strategy A is devoted. We denote
the ex-ante optimal strategy under debt ﬁnancing as B. To simplify the notation, we assume
that strategy B requires an investment I and results in payoﬀs πB >D 0 with probability
qB ∈ (0,1) and π with probability (1 − qB), where πB >π , VB ≡ π + qB(πB − π) >I ,a n d
VA >V B >V C. We assume that strategies A and B are mutually exclusive because they involve
diﬀerent strategies to enter a market or because of a limit to the ﬁrm’s ability to simultaneously
grow and invest in diﬀerent business areas, e.g., a lack of talent and frictional cost of change
in the organization. VAB ≡ VA − VB > 0 is the diﬀerence in the expected payoﬀ with equity
ﬁnancing and the expected payoﬀ with debt ﬁnancing. The higher VAB, the more severe are
the inventive problems of debt ﬁnancing.
Equity ﬁnancing To raise equity, the ﬁrm needs the underwriting service of an investment
bank. We model the equity issue as follows. With probability p(e,i), the required amount
7of equity can be raised at no discount, i.e., the price equals the promised payment to equity
holders. The equity issue fails (is withdrawn) with probability 1 − p(e,i). In the latter case no
equity can be raised. The success probability depends on the ﬁrm’s as well as the investment
bank’s eﬀorts, which are both unobservable and denoted by e and i, respectively. Both parties’
costs of eﬀort are c(e)=.5e2 and c(i)=.5i2. We assume that p(e,i)=m i n {αee + αii,1}
with αe <α i. This captures the idea that the investment bank’s eﬀort is more productive for
issuing equity than the ﬁrm’s. In the remainder of the paper we will assume that there exists
an interior solution and use p(e,i)=αee + αii.
If the equity issue is a success, the ﬁrm carries out the second stage of the project and
chooses strategy A. If the equity issue fails, the ﬁrm cannot immediately start a new attempt
to issue equity, but it can still take on a loan. The mechanism is the same as described above,
and the cost of obtaining the loan is c.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eﬁrm pursues strategy B.W ea s s u m e
that this alternative is preferred to closing the ﬁrm.
The investment bank receives a ﬁxed fee w0 and a bonus β if the equity issue succeeds. w0
c a nb ep o s i t i v eo rn e g a t i v e . I nt h el a t t e rc a s et h eﬁxed fee is akin to an “entry fee” payable
by the investment bank. Equivalently, w0 can be interpreted as a punishment for failure, with
w0+β as the reward in the case of success. In practice we rarely observe negative transfers from
investment banks to their clients. One potential reason may be that this would also attract
ﬁrms that stand no chance to issue equity, but that try to collect the investment bank’s entry
fee (punishment). We therefore explicitly take into account that there may be a lower bound ˆ w
on w0. This is akin to introducing a limited liability constraint (LLC) for the investment bank.
In particular, we assume w0 ≥ 0 so that no negative payments are possible. However, we are
also interested in the implications of relaxing this assumption. As a second case, we therefore
also assume that ˆ w is suﬃciently low so that (LLC) is not binding. Considering both cases is
interesting for two reasons. First, it allows us to carve out the implications of the assumption
that no payments are made from the underwriter to the ﬁrm. Second, in our model with zero
ﬁxed costs of underwriting, (LLC) is always binding for w0 ≥ 0. A reason for why (LLC) may
not be binding despite w0 ≥ 0, is a high ﬁxed cost of underwriting. This case is qualitatively
equivalent to our case, where we assume that ˆ w is suﬃciently low so that (LLC) is not binding.
Without loss of generality, we assume that w0 > 0 is paid through credit to be taken on
8after a failed equity issue, while w0 < 0 reduces the required level of credit after failure.6 w0+β
is positive and paid out of the proceeds of the equity issue. Thus, the equity issue covers the
expansion stage investment and the required payment to the investment bank, E = I + w1.
The equity issue is competitively priced so that the expected payment to equity holders equals
E.
The market for underwriting services is competitive. Therefore, w0 and β maximize the
ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ subject to the bank’s participation constraint. When choosing the op-
timal contract, w0 and β, the ﬁrm has to take into account the double-sided moral hazard
problem. It arises as both the ﬁrm’s and the underwriter’s eﬀorts aﬀect the probability of a
successful equity issue and their contributions cannot be disentangled.
Specialized investment bank The investment bank’s incentive to exert eﬀort stems from
the bonus β.T h eﬁrm exerts eﬀort because a successful equity issue allows it to pursue strategy
A, which increases the expected ﬁrm value by VAB.I ft h eﬁrm has risky debt outstanding, part
of this increase in value accrues to debt holders, as the value of outstanding debt increases by
δ ≡ (qA − qB)(D0 − π). The increase in current owners’ expected payoﬀ is ∆AB ≡ VAB − δ.
Another beneﬁt of a successful equity issue is that it saves the cost of a bank loan, c.
The ﬁrm’s management maximizes the expected incremental proﬁtt oe q u i t yh o l d e r s :
max
e,i,w0,β
(αee + αii)[∆AB + c − β] − w0 −
1
2
e
2
subject to
w0 +( αee + αii)β ≥
1
2
i
2 (PCi)
i = αiβ (ICi)
e = αe[∆AB + c − β] (ICe)
w0 ≥ ˆ w. (LLC)
6The expected future cash ﬂow with strategy B and the outstanding debt D0 place an upper bound on
w0 > 0. However, this constraint will never be binding in our model. We continue to assume that even when
w0 < 0 reduces the required debt after failure, the total debt repayment exceeds ˆ D so that it is still optimal for
the ﬁrm to choose strategy B .
9(PCi) is the investment bank’s participation constraint. (ICi) and (ICe) are, respectively,
the investment bank’s and the ﬁrm’s incentive constraints, which are given by the ﬁrst order
conditions for the optimal choice of i and e. (LLC) puts a lower bound on w0.
The premium β plays a dual role. While it provides the investment bank with incentives
to exert eﬀort, it reduces the ﬁrm’s incentives. This is the nature of the double-sided moral
hazard problem, which makes it impossible to increase the investment bank’s incentives without
negatively aﬀecting the ﬁrm’s incentives.7
If (LLC) is not binding, w0 is determined by the investment bank’s participation constraint.
Substituting the ﬁrst order conditions in the participation constraint, it is straightforward to
check that w0 is negative for any level of β. Thus, the investment bank earns a quasi rent
from the incentive system, which, in the case of a non-binding (LLC), is extracted through
w0.8 H o w e v e r ,i f( L L C )i sb i n d i n g ,i ti sn o tp o s s i b l et o( c o m p l e t e l y )e x t r a c tt h eq u a s ir e n t
through w0.I ti st h e no p t i m a lt oc h o o s ew0 =0and reduce β. Since the investment bank is
more productive than the ﬁrm’s management, αi >α e,i ti so p t i m a lf o rt h eﬁrm to provide
positive incentives for the investment bank despite the rent that the investment bank extracts.
For αi = αe, zero eﬀort by the investment bank would be optimal, as it would in this case be
cheaper for the ﬁrm to bear the higher marginal costs of its own eﬀort than the expected wage
costs to induce the investment bank to spend positive eﬀort.
We ﬁrst assume that (LLC) is not binding. Inserting w0 = 1
2i2 − (αee + αii)β, (ICe), and
(ICi) in the ﬁrm’s objective function gives us
max
β
(α
2
e[∆AB + c − β]+α
2
iβ)(∆AB + c) −
1
2
α
2
e[∆AB + c − β]
2 −
1
2
α
2
iβ
2.
7We note that we implicitly assume a balanced budget. It is therefore not possible to punish both parties for
a failed equity issue above and beyond the transfers between the two parties. In particular it is not possible to
commit to destroying the project if the equity issue fails or to use payments to third parties in case of failure.
Therefore, one party’s punishment is the other party’s gain and vice versa. For that reason, ﬁr s tb e s tc a n n o t
be implemented despite risk neutrality even if (LLC) is not binding.
8In the presence of a high ﬁxed cost, the quasi rent is part of the underwriter’s reimbursement for the ﬁxed
cost.
10The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal β is α2
i(∆AB + c) − (α2
e + α2
i)β =0and
β
∗ =
α2
i
α2
e + α2
i
(∆AB + c). (2)
Inserting β
∗ in the objective function gives the expected proﬁt when a specialized investment
bank acts as underwriter and (LLC) is not binding:
π
nb
i ≡ ν(∆AB + c)
2,
with ν ≡ 0.5(α4
e+α2
eα2
i +α4
i)/(α2
e+α2
i). From ∆AB > 0, it follows that πnb
i > 0 and it is optimal
for the ﬁrm to ﬁrst try to issue equity instead of using outright debt.
If (LLC) is binding, substituting w0 =0and the incentive constraints in the objective
function gives us
max
β
1
2
α
2
e[∆AB + c − β]
2 + α
2
iβ[∆AB + c − β].
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal β is now (α2
i − α2
e)(∆AB + c − β) − α2
iβ =0and
β
∗ =
α2
i − α2
e
2α2
i − α2
e
(∆AB + c).
Inserting β
∗ in the objective function gives
π
b
i ≡
α4
i
2(2α2
i − α2
e)
(∆AB + c)
2
when a specialized investment bank is used and (LLC) is binding. Again, πb
i > 0.
Universal bank Instead of using a specialized investment bank, the ﬁrm can resort to the
investment bank branch of a universal bank. A main diﬀerence is often seen in that the universal
bank can provide credit after failure of the equity issue. We follow Kanatas and Qi (2003) in
assuming that a universal bank that had been used as underwriter has a cost advantage when
providing the credit after a failed underwriting. The cost advantage stems from information
spillover, as a universal bank can economize on monitoring costs and/or relationship-building
costs. The cost savings is given by γc, with γ ∈ (0,1), and allows the universal bank to
earn a (quasi) rent of γc when the equity issue fails. Because of this rent, the universal bank’s
participation and incentive constraints diﬀer from those of a specialized investment bank. They
11are
w0 +( αee + αii)β +( 1− (αee + αii))γc ≥
1
2
i
2 (PCu)
i = αi[β − γc]. (ICu)
The cost savings γc relaxes the investment bank’s participation constraint. Therefore, if
( L L C )i sn o tb i n d i n g ,e . g . ,i fˆ w is suﬃciently low or in a model with ﬁxed costs of underwriting,
a universal bank ceteris paribus provides investment banking services at a lower cost than a spe-
cialized investment bank. This is a potential positive eﬀect of information spillover. However,
at the same time, it reduces the universal bank’s incentive to exert eﬀort, as the investment
bank only earns the rent if the equity oﬀer fails. Compensating for the negative incentive ef-
fect through increasing β is costly for two reasons. First, it reduces the ﬁrm’s incentives and,
s e c o n d ,i ti n c r e a s e st h ei n v e s t m e n tb a n k ’ sr e n ti f( L L C )i sb i n d i n g .T h i si san e g a t i v ee ﬀect of
information spillover. Depending on which eﬀect is stronger, the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁtm a yb e
higher or lower when using a universal bank than when using a specialized investment bank.
The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt levels when using a universal bank are derived in the appendix.
If (LLC) is not binding, we obtain
π
nb
u ≡ γc+ ν(∆AB + c − γc)
2. (3)
The universal bank is preferred if πnb
u >π nb
i ,o rγc+ν(∆AB+c−γc)2 >ν (∆AB+c)2. Rearranging
terms, we obtain that the universal bank is chosen by the ﬁrm when 2ν[∆AB + c − 0.5γc] < 1.
If (LLC) is binding, the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁti s
π
b
u ≡
α4
i
2(2α2
i − α2
e)
(∆AB + c − γc)
2. (4)
It directly follows that πb
u <π b
i.
We can summarize our ﬁndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 i) The ﬁrm will never choose the underwriting service of a universal bank if
( L L C )i sb i n d i n ga n dw0 =0 .
ii) If (LLC) is not binding, the ﬁrm will choose a universal bank if
2ν[∆AB + c − 0.5γc] < 1. (5)
12A universal bank is chosen if the positive information eﬀect exceeds the negative incentive
eﬀect of information spillover. For w0 =0 , the underwriter earns a rent, and the eﬃciency gain
cannot be transferred to the ﬁrm, leaving the negative incentive eﬀect. Thus, the universal bank
will never be chosen in this case.9 If (LLC) is not binding, the bank’s participation constraint is
binding. In this case, condition (5) is satisﬁed when the positive eﬀect dominates the negative
eﬀect. This is the case if the informational economies of scope are rather pronounced.
Before we introduce tying, it is interesting to compare our result with the one obtained by
Kanatas and Qi (2003) in a related setting. Kanatas and Qi assume that w0 =0 . However,
in their model, the bank’s participation constraint can nevertheless be binding because of
ﬁxed monitoring costs. As in our model, an investment bank or a universal bank may be
preferred if the underwriter’s participation constraint is binding, depending on whether the
negative incentive or the positive information eﬀect dominates. If one introduces a punishment
for failure, or an entry fee, i.e., w0 < 0, in their model, which only requires eﬀort by the
underwriter, the universal bank always dominates the investment bank. The reason is that the
negative incentive eﬀect of information spillover can then be overcome at no cost by increasing
β, leaving the positive eﬀect of information spillover. In contrast, in our paper, increasing β
reduces the ﬁrm’s eﬀort incentives.
3 Tying Lending and Underwriting
We turn to the role of tied deals where one bank provides both underwriting services and
al o a nt ot h es a m eﬁrm. In this situation, the underwriter also provides the debt with a
repayment obligation D0.10 For example, the universal bank already provided the initial debt
or new debt is raised from the universal bank that is used to repay initial debt holders. The
value of the debt claim depends on the success of the equity issue and is given by P0 ≡
9This does not hold if incentives stem from reputation as discussed below. There, the additional possibility
to earn a rent from future business can increase incentives to exert eﬀort.
10The assumption that the universal bank takes the total debt is without loss of generality. What is important
is that it assumes the risky portion of the debt. That is, the bank could alternatively assume a repayment
obligation D0 − π that is subordinate to the other claims.
13π +qB(D0 −π)+p(e,i)[(qA −qB)(D0 −π)]. Let P be the amount that the ﬁrm can raise when
issuing the debt claim. In a competitive market, where loans are priced on an individual basis,
P = P0. This, however, is not necessary in a tied deal where the bank has to break even in
total. The universal bank’s participation and incentive constraints are given by
w0 +( αee + αii)β +( 1− (αee + αii))γc− (P − P0) ≥
1
2
i
2 (PCut)
i = αi[β − γc+ δ]. (ICut)
There are two important insights on the beneﬁto ft y i n g . F i r s t ,w0 and (P − P0) are
substitutes in transferring funds from the bank to the ﬁrm. Thus, in the case where w0 ≥ 0,
P can serve as a means to reduce the underwriter’s rent. Second, through tying, the positive
eﬀect of a successful equity issue on the value of the outstanding debt increases incentives. This
second beneﬁt of tying depends on the outstanding debt’s risk, (qA − qB)(D0 −π).T h eh i g h e r
t h er i s k ,t h eh i g h e ri st h ep o s i t i v ee ﬀect on incentives. Thus, it is particularly risky debt that
should be observed in tied deals. It is interesting to note that the ﬁrst beneﬁt of tying is present
even if the outstanding debt is risk free, while the second beneﬁt is present even if P = P0.
In the following, we assume that competition between universal banks reduces P so that the
universal bank’s participation constraint will always be binding in a tied deal.
The ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt when using a universal bank as underwriter in a tied deal is
derived in the appendix and given by
πut = γc+ ν(∆AB + c − γc+ δ)
2. (6)
The following proposition, which is proven in the appendix, compares the ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt
when a universal bank is used as underwriter in a tied deal to the expected proﬁtw h e nt h e
ﬁrm uses a specialized investment bank.
Proposition 2 A specialized investment bank versus a universal bank with tying:
1. If γc < δ, the ﬁrm will always choose a universal bank.
2. If γc > δ and the investment bank’s (LLC) is not binding, the ﬁrm will choose a universal
bank if
2ν[∆AB + c − 0.5(γc− δ)] <
γc
γc− δ
(7)
143. If γc > δ and the investment bank’s (LLC) is binding, the ﬁrm chooses a universal bank
if
2ν[∆AB + c − 0.5(γc− δ)] − τ
(∆AB + c)2
γc− δ
<
γc
γc− δ
, (8)
where τ ≡ 0.5(α2
iα4
e + α6
i − α6
e)/(α2
iα2
e +2 α4
i − α4
e).
If the positive incentive eﬀect from tying exceeds the negative incentive eﬀect from the
information advantage, i.e., δ>γ c ,then a universal bank always dominates a specialized
investment bank: the universal bank has higher total incentives and lower ﬁnancing costs after
failure (Proposition 2.1). In this case, whether or not (LLC) is binding is irrelevant for the
choice of underwriter.
For γc > δ, tying reduces the negative incentives, but they are still present. Comparing
(7) and (8) shows that the universal bank dominates a specialized investment bank for a larger
set of parameters if (LLC) is binding for a specialized investment bank. In this case, providing
incentives involves a rent when the ﬁrm uses a specialized investment bank, while the ﬁrm can
eliminate the rent through tying with a universal bank.
Let Π be the expected advantage of a universal bank (with tying) over a specialized invest-
ment bank. In the following proposition we analyze the eﬀect of δ, γ, and VAB on Π to gain an
intuition for conditions (7) and (8).
Proposition 3 1. Π is increasing in δ.
2. For δ<γ c , there exists a critical b γ ∈ [0,1] such that Π is decreasing in γ for γ<b γ and
increasing in γ for γ>b γ. b γ is increasing in VAB, with b γ =0if VAB ≤ V L
AB ≡ 1/(2ν) − c
and b γ =1if VAB ≥ V H
AB ≡ 1/(2ν).
3. For VAB <VL
AB, Π is positive for all γ.
4. For increasing VAB, Π becomes eventually negative if δ<γ c . However, Π is always
positive if γc < δ.
Increasing δ has an unambiguously positive eﬀect as it reduces the negative net incentives
of a universal bank, γc− δ.
15Increasing γ has two eﬀects. First, it reduces the ﬁnancing costs after a failed equity issue
(positive eﬃciency eﬀect) and, second, it reduces incentives (negative eﬀect). The relative im-
portance of the incentive eﬀect depends on the value increase associated with a successful issue,
VAB. The higher VAB, the more important are incentives. With a large VAB the negative incen-
tive eﬀect dominates and Π is decreasing in γ and eventually becomes negative. If incentives
are not important (low VAB), then the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates and Π is increasing in γ.
For small enough economies of scope (γc < δ) tying eliminates all the negative incentive
eﬀects of the universal bank compared to a specialized investment bank (see Proposition 2).
For small VAB the eﬃciency eﬀect dominates the incentive eﬀect even for larger informational
economies of scope (γc > δ). Therefore, a universal bank will be chosen even for high γ if VAB
is low. However, if VAB is large, the negative incentive eﬀect becomes more and more dominant
with a larger γ and universal banks are only chosen if γ is suﬃciently small. Put diﬀerently, if
incentives are very important, then the information spillover is a competitive disadvantage, and
the universal bank can only potentially compete against a specialized investment bank if the
information spillover is suﬃciently low. If incentives are not so important, then the information
spillover turns into an advantage, and the universal bank indeed does better relative to the
investment bank for all realizations of the informational spillover parameter γ.
Loan pricing in tied deals For a given level of D0, how does the interest rate on debt in tied
deals compare to the debt’s interest rate when the ﬁrm uses a specialized investment bank as
underwriter? The value of the outstanding debt is P0 ≡ π+qB(D0−π)+p(e,i)[(qA−qB)(D0−π)].
Tying aﬀects the interest rate on debt in two ways. First, tied deals with universal banks may
lead to increased incentives compared to the incentives if underwriting is provided by specialized
investment banks. Increased incentives results in a higher probability of success, p(e,i), and
therefore in lower risk. Thus, whenever incentives increase in tied deals, the debt’s interest rate
decreases. However, the debt’s risk-adjusted (or expected) rate of return is not aﬀected by the
higher incentives in tied deals when the loan is competitively priced. Second, with a binding
(LLC), the loan pricing can be used to reduce the rent in the underwriting business. Whenever
P>P 0, the debt’s risk-adjusted interest rate is lower in tied deals.
16Proposition 4 Tying reduces the risk-adjusted (expected) rate of return on the debt if (LLC)
is binding without tying.
This proposition displays a crucial part of our analysis: universal banks may penetrate the
business of specialized investment banks (which formerly have earned rents in underwriting)
by providing tied deals and by competing with lower interest rates. Hence, we should expect
that when universal banks enter the market, the interest rate demanded for debt in tied deals
is below the market rate for debt of the same risk class.
4 Reputation in Investment Banking
A large fraction of the total compensation for investment banking services do not directly
depend on the quality or outcome of the service provided. Instead, a ﬁxed fee is paid, especially
in so called ﬁrm commitment issues (see e.g. Chen and Ritter (2000) and Ritter (1998) for
empirical evidence). This does not imply that the investment bank has no incentive to provide
high quality. Often the market understands the quality provided, even if this quality is not
veriﬁable in a court. Reputation in the market for investment banking services can therefore be
an important determinant of incentives. To focus on reputation incentives and their implications
for competition between investment banks and universal banks, we assume now that no variable
pay is possible, i.e., β =0 . Instead, clients pay a ﬁxed fee w for the investment banking
service. Market participants can observe the quality of investment banking services and choose
a bank based on its history of quality. This assumption is stronger than necessary; it is only
required that low-quality service is detected with a positive probability. To model reputation, we
introduce an inﬁnite number of periods. In each period, ﬁrms want to issue equity as discussed
above with two simplifying assumptions on the probability of a successful equity issue, p(e,i).
First, no eﬀort by the ﬁrm is required when issuing the equity. Second, the investment bank
can choose between only two eﬀort levels, i ∈ {h,l}, resulting in probabilities ph >p l and eﬀort
costs cl =0and ch = k. We assume that high eﬀort is eﬃcient.
The sequence of events in each period t is as follows. In the ﬁrst step, investment banks
simultaneously quote prices wt at which they are willing to provide underwriting services. In
the second step, each ﬁrm chooses the underwriter. Mandates are equally distributed if the
17ﬁrms are indiﬀerent. In the third step, investment banks choose whether to provide high- or
low-quality underwriting services for the individual projects, and market participants observe
the choice. Finally, if the equity issue succeeds, a ﬁrm choose strategy A. If the issue fails, a
ﬁrm raises additional debt and chooses strategy B.
The risk-free rate of return used to discount periods is r. There is no discounting within
periods.
Specialized investment bank All investment banks are symmetric and therefore pursue
t h es a m es t r a t e g y . L e tm be the number of customers that each investment bank obtains in
equilibrium if it did not shirk in previous periods. When deciding on the optimal level of
service, each investment bank compares the expected payoﬀsw i t hl o wa n dh i g he ﬀort. Low
eﬀort on one project results in zero future demand. Therefore, it always pays to either shirk
on all mandates or not at all.11 With low eﬀort, the investment bank saves mk, but will have
zero demand in the future. With high eﬀort, the investment bank has to incur cost mk, but
earns a rent of m
P∞
t=1(wt−k)(1+r)−t from future business. Since the price setting problem of
investment banks is constant over time, in equilibrium, wt ≡ w holds for all t =1 ,..,∞.T h u s ,
the rent from future business equals m(w − k)/r.
High eﬀort is optimal for the investment bank if k ≤ (w − k)/r. Rearranging terms yields
w ≥ (1 + r)k. (9)
Firms seek to obtain the underwriting services from the investment bank that oﬀers advice
at the lowest price and that has an incentive to choose high eﬀort. For w∗ =( 1+r)k,( 9 )h o l d s
with equality. Any deviation from w∗ by individual investment banks results in zero demand.
This is immediately clear for an investment bank that oﬀe r sa d v i c ea tap r i c ee x c e e d i n gw∗.T h e
only reason for undercutting w∗ in the current period is to increase demand above m. While
the current price does not directly aﬀect the incentives of the investment bank, the increased
demand does. Obtaining a higher demand only once and returning to the equilibrium price w∗
11If we assume that the market observes shirking with a positive probability that is increasing in the number
of projects on which the investment bank shirked, then the investment bank might consider shirking on less
than all projects for which it provides advice.
18after one period jeopardizes incentives because the savings from shirking on more than m deals
exceeds the future equilibrium rent. Continuing to provide services at a lower price to increase
future demand also jeopardizes incentives because (9) would be violated. The equilibrium is
summarized in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The following constitutes a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium:
• All investment banks oﬀer high-quality service at price w∗ =( 1+r)k and provide high-
quality.
• If (ph −pl)(VA −VB +c) ≥ (1+r)k,t h e nﬁrms seek high-quality service at price w∗ from
an investment bank that has a history of consistently providing high-quality service. If
(ph −pl)(VA −VB +c) < (1+r)k, then ﬁrms do not demand the service of an investment
bank.
Universal bank Again, the universal bank has a cost advantage γc of providing the credit
after a failed equity issue. Therefore, in addition to saving k, the universal bank also expects to
gain (ph−pl)γc from shirking. However, the expected eﬃciency gain of (1−ph)γc also increases
the rent from future business when choosing high eﬀort. A universal bank chooses high eﬀort if
k +( ph − pl)γc ≤
w − k +( 1− ph)γc
r
.
Thus, the equilibrium price at which a universal bank oﬀers high quality advice has to satisfy
w ≥ (1 + r)k − (1 − ph)γc+( ph − pl)γcr.
The minimum price is lower than for a specialized investment bank if (1−ph)γc ≥ (ph−pl)γcr.
That is, the minimum price is lower if the eﬃciency gain (the expected rent) from providing
credit after failed equity issues exceeds the annualized short-term gain of increasing the expected
rent (the negative incentive eﬀect). In the one-period model with no limited liability, we used
β to deal with the incentive eﬀect and w0 to deal with the eﬃciency gain. In the ﬁxed-price
r e p u t a t i o nm o d e l ,b o t he ﬀects enter the ﬁxed price w.I f(1 − ph)γc ≥ (ph − pl)γcr,u n i v e r s a l
banks can oﬀer high quality service at a lower price than specialized investment banks. Despite
the lower price, universal banks earn a higher expected rent. The reason is that the eﬃciency
19gain is not completely transferred to the ﬁrm. In order to maintain incentives, prices can only
be reduced by (1−ph)γc−(ph −pl)γcr. A price reduction of (1−ph), i.e., the entire eﬃciency
gain, would give an incentive to universal banks to shirk, implying that they will not receive
any mandates at such a low price.
In the absence of reputation concerns, a universal bank is unable to compete with an in-
vestment bank when w0 ≥ 0 (see Proposition 1). Here, we also have w0 ≥ 0 (indeed, w = w0).
Nevertheless, the universal bank may be chosen. The rent from the eﬃciency gain not only
aﬀects incentives to defect today but also has the potential to make future business more prof-
itable for the universal bank, thereby providing a counterbalance to the negative incentive
eﬀect.
Universal bank with tying When we discussed tying in the previous section, we stressed
the possibility of using the pricing of debt to reduce the rent extracted by the universal bank
in the presence of limits on w0. In the current setting, increasing P is akin to reducing the
fee for current business. For modelling purposes we assume that the debt is correctly priced,
i.e., P = P0, and that any changes in incentives through tying are captured by w. However, for
the empirical predictions of the analysis, it is important to note that, in equilibrium, potential
beneﬁts of tying can result in both a lower investment banking fee and a below market rate of
return on the credit (P>P 0). A universal bank chooses high eﬀort in a tied deal if
k +( ph − pl)γc ≤
w − k +( 1− ph)γc
r
+( ph − pl)δ.
Thus, tying again increases a universal bank’s incentives to issue the equity. Incentives
stemming from debt substitute for incentives from high fees in the investment banking business.
To increase incentives, the debt in the tied deal should be as risky as possible. The maximum
debt that can be used without resulting in risk shifting is ˆ D, and therefore ˆ δ ≡ (qA−qB)( ˆ D−π)
provides maximum incentives from tying. Given ˆ δ, t h ep r i c eh a st os a t i s f y
w ≥ (1 + r)k − (1 − ph)γc+( ph − pl)(γc− ˆ δ)r.
Tying has an eﬀect on the universal bank’s incentives similar to that in the model with
variable pay. Again, it not only provides incentives in the underwriting business, but also
reduces the rent of the universal bank when (LLC) is binding.
20W h i l et h ei n c e n t i v ec o n s t r a i n tw a si m p l i e db yt h eb a n k ’ sp a r t i c i p a t i o nc o n s t r a i n ti nt h e
ﬁxed-price model without tying, this is no longer the case with tying. w is now given by
max{(1+r)k,(1+r)k−(1−ph)γc+(ph−pl)(γc−ˆ δ)r}. The universal bank is able to charge a
lower price, which is consistent with incentives not to shirk if (1−ph)−(ph−pl)(1−ˆ δ/γc)r>0.
The partial derivatives of the LHS of this inequality are straightforward. The inequality is
always fulﬁlled if γc < ˆ δ.
We can summarize in:
Proposition 5 i) A specialized investment bank versus a universal bank with tying:
1. If γc < ˆ δ,t h eﬁrm will always choose a universal bank.
2. If γc > ˆ δ, the ﬁrm chooses a universal bank if
(1 − ph) > (ph − pl)(1 − ˆ δ/γc)r.
ii) When competing with specialized investment banks universal banks (with tied deals) are more
likely to be chosen if:
(1) the debt capacity (ˆ δ)i sm o r ep r o n o u n c e d ;
(2) the marginal impact of higher eﬀort (ph − pl)i ss m a l l ;
(3) informational spillovers (γ)a r es m a l l ;
(4) the interest rate (r) is small or, equivalently, the time period between subsequent issues is
small.
In all these cases, the negative incentive eﬀect is small enough and the positive incentive
eﬀect of tying is large enough to make a universal bank with tying the preferred underwriter.
5 Empirical Implications
We summarize in the following what we consider to be the main empirically testable hypothe-
ses stemming from our theoretical analysis. Before doing this, we brieﬂyi n t e r p r e to u rm a i n
parameters.
21The risk of the ﬁrm’s outstanding debt is higher the higher (D0 − π).F i r m sw i t hah i g h e r
degree of risk of outstanding debt should have lower credit ratings. Hence, higher levels of
(D0 − π) translate into lower credit ratings. The diﬀerence (ph − pl) stands for the marginal
eﬀect of high underwriter eﬀorts on the success of the issue compared to a situation with low
underwriter eﬀort. A large marginal impact of the eﬀorts of the underwriter on the probability
of success can especially be expected for ﬁrms that have a transparent business plan that can
be sold rather easily to the equity market if the underwriter provides suﬃcient eﬀort.
Pronounced informational economies of scope prevail if the universal bank, which has acted
as an underwriter to the ﬁrm, saves a high fraction of costs c when providing debt to this
ﬁrm after a failed equity issue. When providing debt, an intermediary incurs the cost of (i)
establishing a customer relation, (ii) evaluating the existing operations, and (iii) evaluating the
new investment opportunity. The underwriter does not have to incur the costs (i) and (ii) again.
The level of cost savings on (iii) depends on how diﬀerent the strategies are. Equity ﬁnancing
and debt ﬁnancing might result in quite diﬀerent investments, potentially in diﬀerent business
ﬁelds. The further apart the strategies A and B (and the respective business ﬁelds in which
they are undertaken), the lower are the cost savings for the universal bank. We therefore argue
that γ is lower for listed conglomerates that want to raise equity in a seasoned equity oﬀering
than for privately owned focused ﬁrms that want to raise equity in an IPO. First, for a listed
ﬁrm public information is available that reduces the cost of establishing a customer relation
and evaluating the existing operations. The ratio of these costs, which an underwriter saves
when providing debt, to total costs is therefore lower for listed ﬁrms than for privately owned
ﬁrms. Thus, ceteris paribus, γ will be lower for listed ﬁrms. Second, conglomerates can invest
in quite distinct business areas. Therefore, the cost savings on evaluation the new investment
opportunity is likely to be lower than for a focused ﬁrm. Ceteris paribus, γ will therefore be
lower for conglomerates.
The parameter VAB reﬂects the the risk shifting problem. The more pronounced the risk
shifting problem, the larger is VAB reﬂecting the notion that in this case debt ﬁnancing is
only feasible for strategies which lead to signiﬁcantly lower net present values of investment
than projects which are equity ﬁnanced. We expect VAB to be higher for ﬁrms with high
growth options, little collateral, and high beneﬁts of starting at a large scale. These ﬁrms can
22exploit a ﬁrst-mover advantage by using their superior technological knowledge. Therefore,
VAB should be high for innovative ﬁrms with superior technological knowledge leading to high
growth potentials and with few tangible assets. In contrast, VAB is low for ﬁrms operating in
mature industries with little growth potentials and pronounced tangible assets.
Finally, we interpret small rates of interest r (in our model with reputation) to occur if the
time length between two periods is small as well. This is most likely if hot issue markets prevail.
We can now summarize our main empirical predictions as follows. First, we address the
choice of underwriters (in the presence of tying) and second, we turn to the expected implications
of tying.
Universal banks (which provide tied deals) are more likely to be chosen:
• By ﬁrms with lower credit ratings (see Proposition 3.1). This hypothesis is addressed and
conﬁrmed by Drucker and Puri (2005).
• By ﬁrms with transparent business plans (see Proposition 5.2).
• By ﬁrms which are little focused, e.g., conglomerates (see Propositions 3.4 and 5.3 ).
• By less innovative ﬁrms with few growth options (see Proposition 3.3).
• In hot issue markets (see Proposition 5.4).
Implications of tying:
• Tying may lead to ﬁercer price competition and below-market rates of interest (see Propo-
sition 4). Alternatively we expect to observe price competition in investment banking fees
(see especially Section 4).
• F i r m st h a th a v eb e e nﬁnanced with a tied deal should be more leveraged than correspond-
ing ﬁrms (see our discussion in the two preceding sections).
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper examines a particular aspect of the expansion of commercial banks’ activities into
investment banking: the ability of universal banks to tie lending and underwriting. This
23phenomenon has increasingly been observed in the last decade. Our theoretical framework
allows us to investigate diﬀerent aspects of this phenomenon and to shed light on the underlying
mechanisms and reasons for tying as well as on the consequences of tying for the parties involved.
We show that commercial banks face a dilemma when entering the underwriting business.
While informational economies of scope between underwriting and lending can reduce the cost
of raising capital, they also reduce incentives in the underwriting business. Tying concurrent
lending and underwriting can help to resolve this incentive problem and enable universal banks
to compete against specialized investment banks. However, risky debt in tied deals does not
only increase incentives in underwriting, it also enables universal banks to provide its services
at lower prices compared to specialized investment banks. Hence, tying turns out to be a mixed
blessing since it allows commercial banks to enter the underwriting markets only at the costs of
ﬁercer price competition and lower overall proﬁtability of this market. On the basis of our model
we expect that universal banks are chosen as underwriters by ﬁrms with speciﬁc characteristics,
e.g., by companies with a low credit rating, less innovative ﬁrms, and ﬁrms with a conglomerate
structure. Our model thereby predicts a segmentation of the underwriting market which would
potentially be even more pronounced if the costs to provide underwriting services diﬀer among
the types of underwriters.
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7.1 Expected proﬁts with a universal bank and no tying, ( 3) and
(4)
We ﬁrst derive Equation (3), where (LLC) is not binding. In this case, the universal bank’s
participation constraint is binding and w0 = 1
2i2 −(αee+αii)β −(1−(αee+αii))γc. Inserting
w0 and the incentive constraints in the ﬁrm’s optimization problem gives us
max
β
γc+( α
2
e[∆AB + c − β]+α
2
i[β − γc])(∆AB + c − γc) −
1
2
α
2
e[∆AB + c − β]
2 −
1
2
α
2
i[β − γc]
2
and the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal β is α2
i(∆AB + c)+α2
eγc− (α2
e + α2
i)β =0 , which
yields
β
∗ =
α2
i
α2
e + α2
i
(∆AB + c)+
α2
e
α2
e + α2
i
γc. (10)
Inserting the optimal values in the ﬁrm’s objective function gives us Equation (3):
π
nb
u = γc+ ν(∆AB + c − γc)
2,
with ν ≡ 0.5(α4
e + α2
eα2
i + α4
i)/(α2
e + α2
i).
We next derive Equation (4), where (LLC) is binding. Now, w0 =0and the ﬁrm’s opti-
mization problem is given by
max
β
1
2
α
2
e[∆AB + c − β]
2 + α
2
i[β − γc][∆AB + c − β].
The ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal β is (α2
i − α2
e)(∆AB + c − β)+α2
i(γc− β)=0and
β
∗ =
α2
i − α2
e
2α2
i − α2
e
(∆AB + c)+
α2
i
2α2
i − α2
e
γc.
Inserting the optimal β in the entrepreneurs objective function gives Equation (4):
π
b
u =
α4
i
2(2α2
i − α2
e)
(∆AB + c − γc)
2.
7.2 Expected proﬁts with a universal bank and no tying, ( 6) and
p r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
With tying, (LLC) is never binding, as the universal bank can adjust P. As adjusting P is a
perfect substitute for adjusting w0, we can assume that (LLC) is not binding and set P = P0.
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2i2 − (αee + αii)β − (1 − (αee + αii))γc and the incentive constraints in the
ﬁrm’s optimization problem gives us
max
β
γc+(α
2
e[∆AB+c−β]+α
2
i[β−γc+δ])(∆AB+c−γc+δ)−
1
2
α
2
e[∆AB+c−β]
2−
1
2
α
2
i[β−γc+δ]
2
and the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimal β is
(−α
2
e + α
2
i)(∆AB + c − γc+ δ)+α
2
e[∆AB + c − β] − α
2
i[β − γc+ δ]=0 .
Rearranging terms yields
β
∗ =
α2
e
α2
e + α2
i
(γc− δ)+
α2
i
α2
e + α2
i
(∆AB + c).
Inserting the optimal values in the ﬁrm’s objective function gives Equation (6),
πut = γc+ ν(∆AB + c − γc+ δ)
2.
We ﬁrst compare πut with πnb
i where (LLC) is not binding for the investment bank. πut >π nb
i
if ν[(∆AB +c)2 −(∆AB +c−γc+δ)2] <γ c .Rearranging terms yields 2ν (γc− δ)[(∆AB +c)−
0.5(γc− δ)] <γ c . This condition is always fulﬁlled if γc < δ.F o rγc > δ the condition can be
written as
ν[2(∆AB + c) − (γc+ δ)] <
γc
(γc+ δ)
When (LLC) is binding for the investment bank, we have to compare πut with πb
i.π ut >π b
i if
α4
i
2(2α2
i − α2
e)
(∆AB + c)
2 − ν(∆AB + c − γc+ δ)
2 <γ c .
Rearranging terms yields
2ν[(∆AB + c) − 0.5(γc− δ)](γc− δ) − τ(∆AB + c)
2 <γ c .
τ =0 .5(α2
iα4
e + α6
i − α6
e)/(α2
iα2
e +2 α4
i − α4
e). This condition is always satisﬁed for γc ≤ δ,a s
αi >α e implies τ>0. Hence, γc < δ is a suﬃcient condition for a universal bank to be optimal.
For γc > δ, the condition can be written as
2ν[(∆AB + c) − 0.5(γc− δ)] − τ
(∆AB + c)2
γc− δ
<
γc
γc− δ
.
267.3 Proof of Proposition 3
A) (LLC) of the specialized investment bank is not binding The universal bank is
preferred if Πuti ≡ πut − πnb
i = γc− ν[2VABγc− 2VABδ + δ
2 +2 cγc − 2cδ − (γc)2] > 0
1) ∂Πuti/∂δ =2 ν[VAB − δ + c]=2 ν[∆AB + c] > 0
2) ∂Πuti/∂γ =[ 1−2ν[VAB+c−γc]]c and ∂2Πuti/∂γ2 = ν>0 with γ ∈ [0,1]. Thus, Πuti is a
convex function of γ. Ignoring for a moment the bounds, 0 and 1, there exists a critical b γ such
that Πuti is decreasing in γ<b γ and increasing in γ>b γ. b γ is deﬁned by 1−2ν[VAB +c−b γc]=0
and b γc = VAB + c − 1/ν.
We can distinguish three cases
(i) b γ ≥ 1 or
∂Πuti
∂γ |γ=1 =1− 2ν[VAB] ≤ 0, i.e., 1 < 2ν[VAB] —>
∂Πuti
∂γ < 0 for γ ∈ [0,1]
(ii) b γ ≤ 0 or
∂Πuti
∂γ |γ=0 =1−2ν[VAB +c] ≥ 0, i.e., 1 > 2ν[VAB +c]. —>
∂Πuti
∂γ > 0 for γ ∈ [0,1]
(iii) b γ ∈ (0,1) or
∂Πuti
∂γ |γ=0 =1− 2ν[VAB + c] < 0 and
∂Πuti
∂γ |γ=1 =1− 2ν[VAB] > 0 i.e.,
2ν[VAB] < 1 < 2ν[VAB + c]
3) From Proposition 2.1 we know that Πuti > 0 for γc < δ.F o rVAB <VL
AB we know from
i) that ∂Πuti/∂γ > 0.S i n c eΠ is continuous in γ, Π > 0 for all γ if V L
AB <V AB.
4) Since ∂Πuti/∂VAB = −ν(γc− δ) < 0,f o rγc > δ. Hence for VAB being suﬃciently large,
Πuti becomes negative.
B) (LLC) of the specialized investment bank is binding The universal bank preferred
if Πutib ≡ πnb
ut −πb
i = γc−ν[2(∆AB +c)(γc−δ)−(γc−δ)2]+
α2
iα4
e+α6
i−α6
e
2(α2
iα2
e+2α4
i−α4
e)(∆AB +c)2 > 0. We
are interested in the comparative statics for γc− δ>0.
1) ∂Πuti/∂δ =[ α4
i/(2α2
i − α2
e)](∆AB + c) > 0.
2) ∂Πuti/∂γ is identical to the case discussed in part A.
3 )T h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si np a r tAa p p l i e s .
4 )T h es a m ea r g u m e n ta si np a r tAa p p l i e ss i n c eν>
α2
iα4
e+α6
i−α6
e
2(α2
iα2
e+2α4
i−α4
e).
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